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DETECTION AND RECOVERY OF
ANTI-FORENSIC (VAULT)
APPLICATIONS ON ANDROID DEVICES
Michaila Duncan and Umit Karabiyik
Sam Houston State University
Department of Computer Science
Huntsville, TX, 77340
{mbd015, umit}@shsu.edu
ABSTRACT
A significant number of mobile device users currently employ anti-forensics applications,
also known as vault or locker applications, on their mobile devices in order to hide files
such as photos. Because of this, investigators are required to spend a large portion of their
time manually looking at the applications installed on the device. Currently, there is no
automated method of detecting these anti-forensics applications on an Android device. This
work presents the creation and testing of a vault application detection system to be used
on Android devices. The main goal of this work is twofold: (i) Detecting and reporting the
presence of various vault applications installed on given Android devices, and (ii) recovering
the files that are hidden by utilizing these vault applications. The testing of our system
was performed on six different devices running different versions of Android and in various
states of rootedness. The findings show that with a fairly comprehensive list of known
vault applications, it is possible to provide a list of the vault applications installed on the
Android device and possibly provide extracted hidden files to the investigator unless they
are encrypted. Hence, our work greatly reduces the amount of time that the investigators
are required to spend examining the applications on the device.
Keywords: mobile forensics, Android OS, anti-forensic, data hiding, vault applications
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile applications that enable users to
store their data securely are often referred
to as “vault” or “locker” applications. These
applications can look like vaults or lockers,
or they can imitate like other types of ap-
plications, such as calculators, media man-
agers, or even stock managers. These vault
applications require the user to type in a cer-
tain passcode in order to access and view
the data that is stored within them. There
are currently hundreds of these applications
available for download on the Google Play
Store (Google, 2018).
The hidden personal data in vault appli-
cations can be anything from photos, videos,
and documents to SMS/MMS messages, call
logs, and contacts and possibly other infor-
mation, depending on the specific applica-
tion being used (see an example in Figure 1).
Because these applications claim to offer a
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higher level of security than the default stor-
age options provided with the device, many
Android users have turned to these applica-
tions to store their data, whether their data
is harmless or illicit. Certainly many users,
including juveniles, are using these applica-
tions to store and hide illicit pictures and
videos of themselves or others.
Figure 1. Screenshots of an example vault
application, Calculator Vault, presenting its
calculator, password entry, and hiding capa-
bilities.
In the past two years, there has been an
increase in the news of the number of police
investigations that involve these vault ap-
plications, particularly involving juveniles.
There have been news articles of cases
in Colorado (Eckholm, 2015), Connecti-
cut (Oliveira, 2015), Kentucky (Millward,
2017), and Huntsville, Texas (Nunez, 2017).
In the criminal case in Huntsville, Texas, a
juvenile student sent a recording and nude
photos to another student who then sent
the recording and photos to many other stu-
dents. Many of the students deleted the me-
dia upon receipt, but several of them kept
the media and stored it either in the default
location for media on their devices or within
a vault application installed on their devices.
When the authorities were conducting their
investigation, they found that they were re-
quired to manually examine every device in
order to ensure that none of the applications
installed on the devices were vault applica-
tions that contained the illicit media.
Given that the challenges have risen in
the cases mentioned above, there are two
main goals of this research. The first goal
is to determine and report on the pres-
ence of vault applications on an Android
device and provide that information to in-
vestigators. This will allow investigators to
spend less time manually checking each ap-
plication for hidden media, as well as in-
creasing the probability that they will find
these vault applications at all due to the
fact that many of these applications look
to be harmless. At the time of writing,
there are at least 256 different vault applica-
tions available for download on the Google
Play Store. Cellebrite’s (Cellebrite, 2018)
digital forensics software is used by a large
number of law enforcement agencies includ-
ing the United States Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, the United States Department
of Justice, and the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (Evans, 2016).
While Cellebrite’s softwares currently pro-
vide many features that allow investigators
to easily analyze the data acquired from mo-
bile devices, one feature that Cellebrite’s
softwares are missing is reporting on the
presence of vault applications on the device
being acquired. Cellebrite softwares will pro-
vide a full list of the applications installed on
the device, but they do not inform the inves-
tigator about suspicious applications. Be-
cause this feature does not exist, investiga-
tors currently are required to manually view
the applications installed on the device to
determine if these applications are on the
device. The purpose of this work is to pro-
vide an automated method for investigators
to utilize in order to determine if any vault
applications exist on the device.
The Autopsy forensic suite is an open
source forensic suite of tools that has many
of the same capabilities as a commercial tool,
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including mobile device forensics, but the
costs of an open source tool are marginal
compared to commercial tools, which makes
it desirable to users who do not have the
funds to purchase commercial software. Like
Cellebrite, Autopsy does not currently have
the capabilities to detect the presence of
vault applications on an Android device.
The second goal of this study is to re-
trieve any unencrypted media uploaded to
any vault applications found on the Android
device. Not every vault application encrypts
the data uploaded by the user. Because of
that fact, and because a major objective of
this project is to assist the investigator to
recover as much as possible, as many unen-
crypted images as possible are retrieved and
presented to the investigator in a separate
Images folder.
The rest of the paper presents related work
in Section 2 which is followed by the ap-
paratus used in Section 3. Section 4 dis-
cusses the five-phase overarching methodol-
ogy. The summary of findings is presented
in Section 5 and Section 6 describes the con-
clusions and future work for the project.
2. RELATED WORK
AND BACKGROUND
Related work in two major areas were re-
viewed. These two major areas are: Android
methods of acquisition, and Android Anti-
Forensic.
2.1 Android Methods of
Acquisition
There are two commonly implemented meth-
ods of Android device data acquisition.
These two major methods are logical acqui-
sition and physical acquisition. In addition
to these common methods, file system acqui-
sition is another technique that is also used
to acquire data from mobile devices.
Logical extraction is an extraction that
stays within the confines of the file system
of the device. Oftentimes, the forensic soft-
ware that is performing the logical acquisi-
tion of the data will load its own mobile ap-
plication onto the device. For instance, the
Cellebrite UFED Forensics Software loads
a device-specific API (Application Program-
ming Interface) to the device for acquisition.
After that, the API is used for read-only
requests for the data in the file system of
the device (Cellebrite, 2014). This method
typically will not retrieve any third party
or deleted data from the device; however,
this method of acquisition is easier for foren-
sic tools to organize back into the file sys-
tem format (Azadegan, Yu, Liu, Sistani, &
Acharya, 2012).
There are two principal types of logical ac-
quisition: Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and
Android Backup. ADB is a free command
line utility included with the Android SDK
that allows for a selection of actions, any-
thing from installing applications to acquir-
ing information from the device (Android,
2017). The ADB method of extraction can
copy parts of the file system of the device.
If the device is not rooted (a method of at-
taining root access to the phone’s operating
system), the ADB method of acquisition will
only be selectively successful and only unen-
crypted app data, user data, and system in-
formation can be acquired from the device.
The investigator will need to enable the hid-
den Developer Options menu in order to en-
able the USB Debugging option for the ADB
acquisition method to work. If the device is
rooted, the ADB method will be able to ex-
tract nearly every file and folder found in the
file system of the device (Jovanovic & Redd,
2012). Android Backup acquisition occurs
when a backup of the device is created and
subsequently analyzed. This backup can be
initiated by the forensic software (such as
Cellebrite UFED Touch) at the time of ex-
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amination, or the backup could have been
made by the user at some point. This acqui-
sition method retrieves little data, but even
retrieving little data is better than retrieving
no data at all (Cellebrite, 2015).
Physical acquisition is a method of acqui-
sition in which a bit-by-bit copy of the device
is made for analysis. This type of acquisition
could potentially recover deleted data that is
not possible with logical acquisition.
There are several ways to perform physi-
cal data acquisitions, but only two types will
be discussed here: boot loader, and the Unix
command line utility “dd.” The boot loader
method of physical data acquisition is per-
formed utilizing the download mode of the
device. While in this download mode, the
device allows the forensic software to install
a small chunk of code into the RAM of the
device that is to be run during the startup,
or boot-up, of the device (Cellebrite, 2014).
This chunk of code is able to read and ob-
tain a copy of the memory. This copy of the
memory will then need to be interpreted by
a forensic software for analysis by the inves-
tigator (see Figure 2 (Cellebrite, 2014)).
Figure 2. A boot loader is uploaded to the
device that allows for the memory to be
transferred to the workstation for analysis.
The “dd” method of physical acquisition
utilizes the Unix and Unix-kernel operating
system command line utility “dd” to copy
files and folders, including copying an en-
tire directory. For this reason, the “dd”
command can be employed to copy the en-
tire directory of an Android device to an
external storage location; however, in or-
der to utilize the “dd” command, the de-
vice must be rooted, which means that ac-
cess to the root directory of the device must
be granted (Lessard & Kessler, 2010). The
resulting file created is referred to as a “raw
image file” and can be decoded by most
forensic softwares.
File system acquisition method allows
making the copy of the file system of the de-
vice particularly allocated space. Although
unallocated space is not acquired with this
method, deleted file remnants might be iden-
tified using database files collected from the
file system of the device.
2.2 Android Anti-Forensic
Techniques
Anti-forensics was defined by Ryan Harris as
“any attempts to compromise the availabil-
ity or usefulness of evidence to the foren-
sics process (Harris, 2006). There are four
common methods of anti-forensics in dig-
ital forensics: destroying evidence, hiding
evidence, eliminating evidence sources, and
counterfeiting evidence (Distefano, Me, &
Pace, 2010).
Destroying evidence means that the evi-
dence has been completely eliminated and is
no longer retrievable. This does not mean
that the evidence was simply rendered in-
accessible; it means that the evidence has
been completely obliterated, whether that
means that the evidence was overwritten by
reformatting the device, wiping the device,
or sanitizing the device. Reformatting the
device is often performed by overwriting all
of the ones and zeros that make up the data
of the device with all zeros and then restruc-
turing the directory of the device. Wiping
the device is typically performed by over-
writing the data one or more times with ran-
dom data or by replacing all of the data with
zeros, similar to reformatting the device, but
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without restructuring the directory. This
causes the data to be completely unrecov-
erable. Sanitizing the device can be done
by overwriting the data on the device with
random data (just like wiping the device, as
described above), or by physically destroying
the device (Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003). This
method is out of the scope of this paper.
Hiding evidence is removing evidence from
plain view so the investigator will be less
likely to locate it. This is not always suc-
cessful, but it has been found to be quite ef-
fective, especially if the evidence is placed in
a location the investigator is not likely to ex-
amine, such as in an application that looks
to be a simple calculator application from
the outside, or by renaming the file in or-
der to avert suspicion (Harris, 2006). This
method plays on the fact that investigators
are human and are not able to check every
location on the device, or that the investiga-
tor may not have knowledge of the locations
in which information could be hidden. This
is the method of anti-forensics that is uti-
lized by vault applications hence t0he target
of our research.
Eliminating evidence sources is a method
that does not destroy evidence. Instead, it
prevents evidence from being created. For
example, an Onion Router could be used in
order to prevent Internet traffic logs from be-
ing created while communicating on a pub-
lic network (Syverson, Reed, & Goldschlag,
2000).
Counterfeiting evidence is a method of
anti-forensics that creates a fake collection of
evidence that is meant to look like something
it is not. This method of anti-forensics is
meant to trick the digital forensics tools and
the investigator working with the data into
believing something that is not true (Harris,
2006).
Last two anti-forensics methods are also
out of the scope of this paper.
3. APPARATUS
This section outlines the apparatus used in
the testing of this project. All the Android
devices that are utilized in this research are
shown with their Android OS version and
rooting options in Table 1. The initial An-
droid device used when installing the vault
applications was a Huawei Premia 4G M931
mobile phone running Android kernel ver-
sion 3.0.21-perf. The service provider was
MetroPCS, but there was no SIM card in-
stalled in the device. The total storage avail-
able on the device was 2.28GB total inter-
nally with 2.15GB of the internal memory
available for utilization by the user. An 8GB
MicroSD card was installed into the device
for additional storage. The device was suc-
cessfully provided root privileges using Fra-
maroot APK and USB debugging mode was
enabled. Full root privileges, which is con-
sidered to be the automatic possessing of ad-
ministrator level privileges at the command
prompt startup, were enabled by installing
ADBD Insecure on the device.
A secondary Android device was also used
for additional testing of the program. This
secondary device was a LG LS840 Viper
mobile phone running Android kernel ver-
sion 3.0.8. The service provider was Sprint,
but there was no SIM card installed in
the device. The total storage available on
the device was 1.73GB total internally with
0.97GB of the internal memory available for
use by the user. A 16GB MicroSD card was
installed into the device for additional stor-
age. The device was successfully provided
root privileges using SRSRoot and USB de-
bugging mode was enabled. Full root priv-
ileges were enabled by installing ADBD In-
secure on the device. The third device, LG
Nexus 5, was used for testing as well. It
was rooted using CF-Auto-Root and USB
debugging mode was enabled. Full secure
root privileges could not be enabled on this
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Table 1. Mobile devices used in experiments.
Mobile Device Android version Root Option
Huawei Premia 4G M931 4.0.4 (Ice Cream Sandwich) Rooted
LG LS840 Viper 4.0.4 (Ice Cream Sandwich) Rooted
LG Nexus 5 6.0.1 (Marshmallow) Rooted
Samsung Galaxy Rush SPH-M830 4.1.2 (Jelly Bean) Unrooted
Motorola Photon Q XT897 4.0.4 (Ice Cream Sandwich) Unrooted
Huawei Prism U8651T 2.3.6 (Gingerbread) Unrooted
device.
A workstation running Linux Ubuntu was
utilized. Tools configured on the worksta-
tion included Android Debug Bridge (ADB),
Python version 2.7.12, Android Studio ver-
sion 2.3.3, and an SQLite browser. A work-
station running Windows 10 was also uti-
lized. Tools configured on this workstation
included Cellebrite UFED Reader version
6.2.0.79, and Autopsy forensic suite version
4.3.0. Additionally, a workstation running
Windows 7 with OpenText’s EnCase Soft-
ware version 7.10 was utilized.
4. METHODOLOGY
In order to verify the presence of vault appli-
cations on an Android device and to retrieve
the media stored within those applications,
the development and testing of this research
was divided into five phases: scenario cre-
ation, list creation, device analysis, program
creation, and program testing.
4.1 Scenario Creation
The purpose of this phase was to simulate
actual user data on the Android device. To
begin with, eight different vault applications
were installed on the Huawei Premia 4G
M931. These applications were chosen at
random from the list of 256 vault applica-
tions. A list of these applications can be seen
in Table 2. The eighth application, Smart
Hide Calculator (com.ids.smartcalculator)
was initially installed on the device, but the
application was not operational; therefore,
the application was subsequently removed
from the device.
Table 2. Eight initial vault applications in-
stalled on the initial rooted Android device
* Application removed from device because it was non-
functional
Application Name Package Name
Audio Manager com.hideitpro
Calculator Private Photo
Video Locker
secret.hide.calculator
Calculator Vault com.calculator.vault
Gallery Lock com.morrison.gallerylocklite
Keep Your Media Safe it.ideasolutions.kyms
Photo Locker com.handyapps.photoLocker
Vault Hide com.netqin.ps
Smart Hide Calculator* com.ids.smartcalculator*
After the application setup, ten different
photos with the file extension “.jpg” were up-
loaded into each application, and no two ap-
plications received the same photos as any
other application. No videos were uploaded.
4.2 List Creation
During this phase of the project, a list was
created containing applications currently on
the Google Play Store available for down-
load. This list was created by perform-
ing several different searches on the Google
Play Store with keywords such as “Vault”,
“Locker,” and “Hide Media.” For each ap-
plication that matched the query, details of
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the application, such as the full application
name, the package name, and the developer
name. An approximate size of the appli-
cation was acquired by using a third-party
website called Appbrain (AppBrain, 2018).
In total, 256 different applications were en-
tered into the list with room to add more in
the future.
4.3 Device Analysis
During this phase, the Huawei Premia 4G
M931 was analyzed in order to determine a
course of action for the next phase of the
project, which is program creation. This
phase consisted of acquiring the data from
the device and analyzing it to see what data
was extracted from the applications installed
on the device and where that data was lo-
cated on the device.
The acquisition process began by utilizing
a Cellebrite UFED Touch terminal. A phys-
ical acquisition, a logical acquisition, and
a file system acquisition of the device was
performed and each data extraction was an-
alyzed with UFED Reader, which was in-
stalled on the Windows 10 workstation.
Table 3. Number of images acquired by each
acquisition method
Acquisition Method Number of Images
Physical Acquisition 1700
Logical Acquisition 600
File System Acquisition 1300
Table 3 describes the number of images ac-
quired from the device by each data acqui-
sition method. While examining the images
located during the three acquisitions, it was
determined that several of the images were
located in some of the data folders associated
with the anti-forensics applications installed
on the device. Images being found in these
folders indicates that these applications do
not perform any kind of advanced hiding
techniques, and instead merely remove the
images from their original location.
An additional physical acquisition of the
device was performed by using the Unix
command line utility “dd.” This device ac-
quisition was performed with the guideline
provided in (Lohrum, 2018). The acquisi-
tion was examined using Autopsy Forensic
Suite installed on the Windows 10 work-
station. The examination revealed that
several of the images that had been ini-
tially placed onto the 8GB MicroSD Card
and subsequently deleted were recovered by
Autopsy. All of these images were the
images uploaded to the application Au-
dio Manager (com.hideitpro). Additional
images were also located in the acquisi-
tion of the device. These images were
not previously deleted, but were instead
merely moved to a new location of the
device storage by their respective applica-
tions. These images were the images up-
loaded to the applications Calculator Vault
(com.calculator.vault), Calculator Private
Photo Video Locker (secret.hide.calcualtor),
Gallery Lock (com.morrison.gallerylocklite),
and Vault Hide (com.netqin.ps). No addi-
tional images were located in the acquisitions
that were useful to our work.
The Unix command line utility “dd” phys-
ical acquisition was examined using Open-
Text’s EnCase Forensic Software (just before
the time of the writing of this paper, Guid-
ance Software, the original creator of EnCase
Forensic Software, was merged with Open-
Text (OpenText, 2018)). The results of that
examination were the same as those from the
Autopsy Forensic Suite examination.
The information that was gathered from
analyzing these acquisitions was useful in the
creation of the program to determine the
presence of anti-forensics applications. It
was also helpful in order to potentially re-
trieve the data that was stored by the anti-
forensics application.
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4.4 Program Creation
This program is built with the Python pro-
gramming language. It compares the pack-
age names of the applications installed on
the device to the package names in the list
created previously. If any of these package
names are confirmed matches, the program
flags that application by writing the applica-
tion’s name and package name to a text file,
and attempts to recover any of the images
hidden by each application.
Figure 3. A fully rooted device has full
root privileges at the initial command line
prompt.
It was found that vault applications could
be detected on three different types of An-
droid devices: fully rooted, semi-rooted, and
unrooted devices. Fully rooted devices are
devices that have full root (administrator)
privileges, even at the initial command line
prompt (Figure 3). Semi-rooted devices are
devices that are rooted, but an additional
command must be executed to receive full
root privileges at the command line prompt
(Figure 4). Unrooted devices are devices
that have no root privileges at all (Figure
5).
Figure 4. A semi-rooted device is rooted, but
an additional command must be executed to
receive full root privileges at the command
line prompt.
Because fully rooted devices are the most
likely devices to produce the most data, a
large amount of time was spent developing a
Figure 5. An unrooted device has no root
privileges.
way to successfully acquire as much informa-
tion as possible from the vault applications
installed on this type of device. With exper-
imentation, it was discovered that the most
reliable way to detect the applications and
collect data from them would be to use the
following command:
adb pull /data/data/<Package_Name>/
The ADB command above will allow to
access the application data files and acquire
the data contained in them. This command
copies the data file of an application if the
package name of that application is the same
as the package name of any application in the
vault application list that was created previ-
ously. The copy of the data file is placed
into the user-specified case directory that
is placed in the original program directory.
Once all of the relevant data directories are
copied, the program looks for files within the
directories that have the file extension of ei-
ther “.jpg” or “.png” and copies those files to
a separate Images directory within the user-
specified case directory. As depending solely
on the extension of a might be misleading,
our tools also checks the header individual
files for magic numbers (hexadecimal value
of known file types). For example, if the
first two bytes of the file header is 0xFFD8,
then the file is marked as JPEG file, and
if the first four bytes of the file header is
0x89504E47, then the file is marked as PNG
file.
Once as many data files as possible are re-
covered and copied to the Images directory
in the user-specified case directory, the pack-
age names associated with each of the data
directories and its common application name
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are copied into a text file to be reviewed by
the investigator later in the event that the
investigator decides that they would like to
manually review the applications either on
the device or with a separate forensic soft-
ware, such as Cellebrite or Autopsy.
Semi-rooted devices are rooted and still
have access to the data files of the device,
but the command that was used for the
fully rooted devices will not work for the
semi-rooted devices because the administra-
tor permissions are not immediately acces-
sible. Therefore, an alternative method was
used to detect the presence of vault applica-
tions on this type of device. To begin with,
the command
adb shell "su -c ‘ls /data/data >
/sdcard/Information/<FileName>.txt’"
was employed to compile as list of the pack-
age names of the vault applications installed
on the device. Once the package names
of the applications are collected, they are
placed into a text file along with the com-
mon application name for the investigator
to review later. The text file is saved to the
user-specified case directory in the program
directory. This text file is then used with the
command
adb shell "su -c ‘cp -R /data/data/
<PackageName>/sdcard/Information/’")
This command copies the package’s data di-
rectory from the device’s internal storage to
the SD card installed to the device. That
data directory can then be copied from the
device to the user-specified case directory by
utilizing the command
adb pull /sdcard/Information/<Pkg_Name>
Both of the commands above together are
able to get around the fact that the device is
only semi-rooted and requires an extra com-
mand in order to access full root capabilities.
Once the relevant data files are moved
to the user-specified directory, the program
follows the same procedure as that of the
fully rooted devices by looking for “.jpg” and
“.png” files and moving them to the Images
directory of the user-specified case directory.
Many of the vault applications, such as
Gallery Lock and Gallery Lock Lite, modify
the data uploaded to the applications in or-
der to circumvent attempts at recovering the
data. However, many of these applications
do not encrypt the data, but instead merely
change the file extension. Gallery Lock and
Gallery Lock Lite both perform this type of
data hiding by changing the file extension
to “.glk.” The vault detection program is
programmed to know that these two appli-
cations should have this modified data and
therefore searches specifically for that data
when it encounters these applications. Sev-
eral applications that store their data simi-
larly to Gallery Lock and Gallery Lock Lite
are specially accounted for and the vault de-
tection program is able to acquire their files
as well. These files that have a modified file
extension are typically still viewable using a
standard image viewing application, so the
program merely copies those files to the Im-
age directory in the user-specified case di-
rectory in order to keep the integrity of the
file intact. Additionally, many vault applica-
tions attempt to hide their data by placing
the data on the device’s SD Card. The vault
detection program is able to search specifi-
cally for the data of several of those applica-
tions as well.
Zhang et al. (Zhang, Baggili, & Bre-
itinger, 2017) outline their work analyzing
and recovering data from the eighteen most
popular vault applications available on the
Google Play Store. This paper was useful
in determining the different locations that a
vault application can potentially use to store
the uploaded images and possibly where any
plaintext passwords to unlock the applica-
tion could be stored on the device. Their
work also provided useful information on ap-
plications that change the file extension of
the uploaded data.
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Table 4. Eleven additional applications and their associated package names installed to the
Huawei Premia M931
Application Name Package Name
Timer Lock - Photo Video Hide krk.timerlock.timervault
Hide App, Private Dating, Safe Chat - PrivacyHider com.trigtech.privateme
SCalc Free com.luca1897.scalc.free
QuickPic - Photo Gallery with Google Drive Support com.alensw.PicFolder
Magic Box (Hidden photos) cn.menue.photohider.international
Photo Shield - Hide Photos and Videos com.genie9.glock
Pandora since2006.apps.pandora
Photo Gallery (Fish Bowl) com.littlefatfish.photo
Hide Files - Andrognito com.codexapps.andrognito
Multi Account - Secure Storage com.reny.securespaceaccount
Undershare Photo Gallery Lock com.minichief.undershare.viewer
Unrooted devices are more difficult to ana-
lyze because the data contained on this type
of device is more protected than the data on
the other two types of devices. Therefore,
the program is unable to acquire the data
directories of these devices. However, vault
applications can still be detected on this type
of device and the names of these applications
can still be provided to the investigator for
the investigator to review the applications
manually.
In order to detect the vault applications,
we utilized the following command:
adb shell pm list packages
This command lists all of the packages in-
stalled on the device. The output of this
command was directed to a text file and
the contents of that text file were compared
against the data contained in the list of vault
applications created previously. If any of the
package names from the device match the
package name of an application in the list,
that package name and the common appli-
cation name are placed into a separate text
file for the investigator to review later.
For the program to know which set of
commands to use on the device, it takes in
user input at runtime. This input is an op-
tion that is either “r,” “-s,” or “u.” The
“-r” option selection dictates that the pro-
gram should execute the fully rooted device
commands. The “-s” option selection des-
ignates that the program should implement
the semi-rooted device commands. The “-
u” option selection means that the program
should execute the unrooted device com-
mands.
4.5 Testing and Preliminary
Results
Huawei Premia 4G M931: Program
testing began with the initial seven applica-
tions installed on the first rooted Android
device. After the program was successful
in locating, listing, and acquiring any data
associated with these installed vault appli-
cations placed on the device, an additional
eleven applications were installed on the first
rooted Android device. Table 4 lists the
names and package names of the eleven ap-
plications installed to the device. After the
application installation and setup, ten differ-
ent photos with the file extension “.jpg” were
uploaded into each application, and no two
applications received the same photos as any
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other application. No videos were uploaded.
The device was fully rooted, so the pro-
gram was not only able to detect the vault
applications installed on the device, but was
also able to recover some of the images that
were uploaded to the applications. The pro-
gram was able to recover all of the images
from seven of the vault applications that
were installed on the device. It was also able
to recover some of the images from three of
the other applications.
LG Viper LS840: After testing the first
rooted Android device, the second fully
rooted Android device was used for test-
ing. Ten different vault applications were in-
stalled on the device. It was discovered that
one of the applications, Ultimate Calculator
Hide (com.chiragnew.HIDEcalculator ) was
not functional therefore it was subsequently
removed from the device. After the initial
setup for each of the applications, ten dif-
ferent photos with the files extension “.jpg”
were uploaded into each application, and no
two applications received the same photos as
any other application. No videos were up-
loaded. Table 5 lists the names and pack-
ages names of the applications installed to
the device, including the application that
was removed from the device due to being
non-functional.
Similar to the Huawei Premia, the LG
Viper was also fully rooted. Therefore, the
vault detection program was able to not only
obtain the names of the vault applications
installed on the device, but it was also able
to recover some of the images that were up-
loaded to the vault applications.
The program was able to detect all nine of
the installed vault applications on the device
and was able to recover all of the files from
one of the applications installed on the de-
vice. Our program was also able to retrieve
some of the images from two additional vault
applications installed on the device.
LG Nexus 5: Testing of the program’s
semi-rooted device vault detection capabil-
ities was performed using the LG Nexus 5.
The program was able to detect and obtain
data from the installed vault applications
and was able to compile the names of these
applications into a text file. Table 6 lists the
application names and their associated pack-
age names of the vault applications installed
to the device.
The program was able to detect all ten of
the installed vault applications on the de-
vice and was able to recover all of the files
from three of the vault applications installed
on the device. The vault detection program
was also able to acquire images from two ad-
ditional vault applications installed on the
device.
Unrooted Devices: Each of the three un-
rooted devices (Samsung Galaxy Rush, Mo-
torola Photon Q, and Huawei Prism) were
tested against the program to test the capa-
bilities of detecting vault applications on un-
rooted devices. Ten vault applications were
installed on the Samsung Galaxy Rush (see
Figure 7) and the Motorola Photon (see Fig-
ure 8) devices. Only seven applications were
installed on the Huawei Prism (see Figure 9)
device due to lack of storage available on the
device. Ten unique photos were uploaded to
each of the applications on all three of the
devices.
The vault detection program was able to
detect all twenty-seven applications installed
on the devices and placed each application
name and package name into a text file for
the investigator to review later. Neverthe-
less, our system was not able to recover any
hidden files from any of those vault appli-
cations because the vault applications keep
hidden files located under /data/data direc-
tory which is not accessible without root
privileges.
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Table 5. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the LG Viper
LS840
*Application removed from device because it was non-functional
Application Name Package Name
Folder Lock com.newsoftwares.folderlock v1
Pic Lock- Hide Photos & Videos com.xcs.piclock
A+ Gallery Photos & Videos com.atomicadd.fotos
Private Zone - AppLock & Vault com.leo.appmaster
Secret Gallery com.kts.secret.gallery
Calculator Photo & Video Vault com.yptech.privategallery
Ultimate Calculator Hide* com.chiragnew.HIDEcalculator*
Hide Images Videos And Files com.alpha.filehider
Vault : Hide Pictures Videos Gallery & Files com.gamemalt.vault
Calculator Lock - Private Photo hide com.calculatorlock
Table 6. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the LG Nexus 5
Application Name Package Name
Applock com.domobile.applock
Hide Pictures & Videos - Vaulty com.theronrogers.vaultyfree
Hide Pictures PhotoSafe Vault com.slickdroid.vaultypro
Gallery lock : Photo Lock sunstarphotomedia.photolockerpro
Hide Pictures Gallery Vault com.mallow.hidepicturesgalleryvault
Secret AppLock com.amazing.secreateapplock
VaultDroid - Calculator Vault com.vaultdroid.calculatorhidephoto
Hide Photos com.domobile.hidephotos
Gallery com.threestar.gallery
Hide Something - Photo, Video com.colure.app.privacygallery
5. SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS
From the case studies with the different de-
vices and a total of sixty-four applications,
it is determined that 100% of the vault ap-
plications can be detected, even on unrooted
devices. On fully rooted and semi-rooted de-
vices, it is possible to not only detect 100%
of the applications, but it is also possible to
recover hidden files that were uploaded to
the vault applications by the user. The vault
detection program was able to recover unen-
crypted images, particularly if those images
were stored in the data directory of the ap-
plication on the device.
While this program was mostly only able
to acquire the unencrypted files associated
with the vault applications, more advanced
forensic programs designed to acquire and
decrypt images may be able to acquire the
additional images that this program was un-
able to obtain. This vault detection tool’s
primary goal was to detect whether vault
applications were present on an Android de-
vice and recover as many hidden files as pos-
sible. Our testing and preliminary results
show that our program is able to recover
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Table 7. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the Samsung
Glaxy Rush
Application Name Package Name
Photo & Video Locker - Vault inno.gallerylocker
Folder & File Locker, Hide Picture,Video Vault Pro gallery.locker
Secret Lock jacob.secret.lock
Calculator Vault carol.calculator.calculatorvault
Joy Gallery - lock, hide, good com.threebillion.joygallery
Secret Photo Hide -Photo Vault com.photovault
Calculator Plus Gallery Vault Photo Video Locker com.calculatorhide.calculatorgallerylockvault
Photo Vault Hide Pictures And Videos -KeepSecret com.arcapps.keepsafe
Photo Locker - Hide Pictures and Videos itianz.photolocker
File Hidder - Hide Image & Video org.ccc.pb
Table 8. Ten applications and their associated package names installed to the Motorola
Photon Q
Application Name Package Name
Gallery Vault - Hide Pictures And Videos com.thinkyeah.galleryvault
Safe Gallery (Media Lock) ukzzang.android.gallerylocklite
Secure Gallery(Pic/Video Lock) com.sp.smartgallery.free
Vault - Hide Pictures & Videos net.newsoftwares.folderlockadvanced
Photo Locker com.rand.photolocker
Photo & Video (Gallery) Lock com.os.photo.video.gallery.lock
Calculator Vault me.lam.calculatorvault
Hide Photos com.domobile.hidephotos
Ami Album-Hide photos & videos com.gionee.freya.gallery
Calculator-Gallery Locker in.ssdevelopers.security
Table 9. Seven applications and their associated package names installed to the Huawei
Prism
Application Name Package Name
Hide Pictures Keep Safe Vault com.kii.safe
AppLock com.domobile.applock
LOCX Applock Lock Apps & Photo com.cyou.privacysecurity
Image Locker -Hide your photos com.inno.imagelocker
Smart Hide Calculator com.ids.smartcalculator
Super Vault - hide pictures com.hideimagevideo.supervault
Hide photos/videos - iLock Neo com.capacus.neo
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100% of the apps and also able to recover
and reconstruct significant number of hidden
files with matched hash values.
6. LIMITATIONS
Although our work shows outstanding suc-
cess recovering vault applications, we are
also aware of some limitations. First, the
targeted mobile device screen must be un-
locked and USB debugging mode must be
enabled. However, because this is likely not
the only tool an investigator will be employ-
ing in order to analyze the device, it is likely
that he or she has physical access to the
device and is able to put the device into
an unlocked state and enable the USB de-
bugging capabilities. Needless to say that,
other commercial tools such as Cellebrite
also require the phones being unlocked and
USB debugging mode activated. Second,
this study only focused on Android appli-
cations available on the Google Play Store.
There are other, third-party locations from
which a user can download additional appli-
cations. Third, the Google Play Store is con-
stantly changing; additional applications are
being uploaded every day. The current list of
vault applications created for this work will
require updating on a regular basis for the
program to continue to work properly. How-
ever, it is recommended that none of the en-
tries to the list are ever removed, even if the
application no longer exists on the Google
Play Store, because it is possible for a user
to continue to use an application even af-
ter its removal from the Google Play Store.
Fourth, this work was only tested on devices
running Android operating system versions
2.3.6 to 6.0.1. Anything older or newer was
not tested, and it is unknown if the program
will work on any other versions. Lastly, this
work is limited only to Android vault and
locker applications and did not take into ac-
count other mobile operating systems, such
as iOS and Windows.
7. CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
As shown from the results, it is possible to
detect vault applications on an Android de-
vice and recover their hidden files. It is also
significantly helpful to present the findings
to the investigator in an easy-to-understand
manner by using a list of known vault appli-
cations. Our proof of concept design shows
the possibility of these objectives. As part of
the future work, we plan acquiring and de-
crypting the encrypted data created by vault
applications for presentation to the investi-
gator. We also would like to extend our work
to all other file types and information hid-
den. We also believe that the future work
should also examine the possibility of detect-
ing vault applications on iOS devices. Lastly,
work should explore the feasibility of creat-
ing a graphical user interface to provide ad-
ditional ease-of-use for the investigator.
As part of our efforts to support open
source forensic tools community and to al-
low future research opportunities, our source
code used in this work is available upon re-
quest and also publicly shared at http://
www.shsu.edu/uxk006/resources.html.
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